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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE S. ~ffiiTTING, JUDITH
SILVA and DANIEL SILVA,
dba JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB,
Plaintiffs Appellants
vs.
CHARLES R. CLAYTON,
of Midvale City,
et al., and MIDVALE CITY,
a municipal corporation,

~ayor

Defendants Respondents.

1
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
}
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16543

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATR~ENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

Appellants initiated this action in the Court of the
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake county, utah,
praying for an Extraordinary Writ to review and reverse the
ruling of the City Council of the City of Midvale, which
revoked the business license held by Appellants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake county,
Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge presiding, entered
its Order affirming the action of the City Council of the
City of 11idvale.
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RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the District Court's
Order which affirmed the nuisance abatement method used by
respondents in revoking the business license of appellants;
and in the event this Court upholds the lower Court's
decision, a restraining order pending the final determination
of plaintiffs/appellants' CoMplaint pending in lower Court.
STATEMENT OF PACTS
Appellants began operating a business

kno~n

as Judd's

Frontier Club, at 7890 South State Street, Midvale, Utah, on
or about December, 1976, pursuant to a business license
obtained from the Midvale City.

Appellants are in the

business of selling beer and soft drinks and operate what is
commonly known as a "beer bar"; appellants do not possess
a license to, nor sell, or dispense "hard liquor" pursuant
to any authority or licensing by the Utah Liquor Control
Commission.
On or about May 15, 1978, the individual defendants,
acting as the mayor and the city council of Midvale City,
held a public hearing for the purpose of considering the
revocation of the business license theretofore issued
to appellants.
On or about May 30, 1978, the Midvale City

Counc~l

issued its Findings of Fact and Order revoking aooellants'
business licenses, findi~g that appellants were maintaining
a public nuisance contrary to the city ordinances.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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After the Order of revocation appellants filed this
action in District Court and obtained a Temporary Restraining
Order.

Appellants' Complaint states several causes of action,

and, concurrently, appellants' amended Complaint sought the
relief provided for under Rules 65A and 65B of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to the appellate review
on the certified record.
The District Court, the. Honorable Judge James S. Sawaya
presiding, after a hearing which was held on June 12, 1979,
entered its Order (pages 128 and 129 of this record) affirming
the action of revocation theretofore taken by the City
Council; said order was entered on June 25, 1979.
On June 27, 1979, appellants by and through their attorney
of record, Nick J. Colessides, filed a Notice of Appeal,
appealing the order entered by Judge Sawaya, to the
Utah Supreme Court.
On June 29, 1979, respondents filed their

~1otion

to Amend

Findings and Order (page 136 of this record) and after a brief
conference among all counsel and Judge Sawaya, the trial Court
entered its order granting respondents their motion to "
amend the Order entered hereinto on the 25th day of June, 1979."
Subsequently thereto, respondents filed and the Court
approved Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (page 137
to 142) and the Court entered its Amended Order of Judgment
(pages 143 to 144).
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-3-

Appellants' Complaint alleging certain other causes of
action is presently pending before the Third Judicial District
Court, and this appeal was necessitated by the fact that
implicit in Judge Sawaya's Order and/or Amended Order, there
was a dissolution of the Court's theretofore issued restraining order.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO PROCEED
UNDER THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY GIVEN
TO CITIES TO ABATE PUBLIC NUISANCES.
Respondents' theory of the right of revocation of
the business license by the Midvale City Council is based upon
a theory of nuisance and the abatement thereof.
Utah law specifically provides for a meothd of abatement
of a public nuisance and specifically sets forth the criteria
of a public nuisance together with the exact procedure a public
body must follow in order to abate a nuisance.
Assuming arguendo that the acts complained of by respondents are in fact true and within the state statutory or city
authority section 76-10-808 specifically designates the forum
where an abatement of the

nuisa~ce

shall occur.

There, it is

stated that a city attorney is empowered to institute an action
in the name of the city to abate a public nuisance.

Further

it is stated therein:
" ... The action shall be brought
in the district court of the d1strict
where the public nuisance exists and
shall be in the form prescribed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure .... "
Nowhere in the Utah State Code the power to abate nuisances
is given to a city council or other administrative body.

It is

exclusively within the province of the district and subject to
the Rules of the Civil Procedure.
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The fact that exclusive jurisdiction to abate a nuisance
is vested with the district court is further buttressed by
the provisions of section 78-38-1, wherein it defines a nuisance
and makes it a
subject of an action.
Such action
may be brought by any person ... ; and by the
judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated,
and damages may also be recovered. Utah Code
Annotated § 78-38-1. (emphasis supplied).
It is clear from this language that in dealing with
nuisance abatement the law contemplates an action at law, to be
tried in a court of competent jurisdiction, and a judgment to
be entered thereunder; it is not contemplated nor authorized by
state statute, that a city council may act as a forum to
adjudicate the abatement of a nuisance.
Furthermore, the provisions of section 76-10-808 provide
for the relief to be granted in the event a nuisance is

establis~

ed, and the relief contemplated is judicial relief which can be
had pursuant to a judgment entered by a court.
Respondents claim that appellants' conduct of their business
creates a nuisance, as it is defined in Ordinance No. 7-2(d)
of the ordinances of Midvale City, wherein it states:
(d) Laws or ordinances are
violated by licensees, agents, or
patrons with the consent of knowledge of licensees upon such premises
which tend to affect the public health,
peace or morals are hereby declared
to be nuisances.
(emphasis added).
R-109.
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It was stipulated by counsel for respondents that the
city in its proceedings relied upon the alleged violations
of subsection (d) to revoke the business licenses of
appellants (see Tr. p.22 to p.23 line 3).

In essence

the city relying upon a theory of nuisance sought to abate
the alleged nuisance by revoking ap9ellants' business license,
rather than file a civil action against appellants to abate an
alleged nuisance which by necessity would have required the city
to seek and obtain an

independe~t

judicial determination of

the facts.
Appellants do not quarrel with the right of respondents
to abate a nuisance; only the method sought by the city to
abate the alleged nuisance.

Nevertheless,

"The power of a municipal corporation to
define, declare, a~d deal with a nuisance
is restricted ... A municipalitY can provide that a particular buslness-ordinarily
lawful and unobjectionable, e.g., a hotel
[or as in this instance a "beer bar"]
cannot operate after it has been found by
a court of comoetent iurisdiction to be
oPerated in a ~annerinjurious or dangerous
to the public morals, health or safety.
But such an adjudication must have been
made by a court 1vith jurisdiction in the
premises. McQuillin, Hunicipal Corporations,
§24.64 (citations omitted).
While a municipality has a right under its police power
to declare and restrain nuisances such power is not an
uncontrollable power at the will and whim of the local
authorities.
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" .•. Under the rule denying municipal
power to declare as a nuisance that which
is not a nuisance, a municipal corporation,
cannot, under its police power or its
specific power to suppress nuisances,
suppress in toto or in part any legitimate
business, trade or occupation which is
not a nuisance per se, in fact or under
state statute ... A fortiori, a municipality
cannot make a nuisance that which state law
expressly authorizes. Under the rule, indeed,
to justify any municipal interference with
the enjoyment of property as a nuisance,
two facts must be established: first, that the
property, either per se or in the manner of
using it, is a nuisance, and, second, that the
interference does not extend beyond what is
necessary to correct the evil. At least,
property rights cannot be taken away by an
ordinance declaring that to be a nuisance
which is not a nuisance per se or in fact ...
McQuillin, §24.66, p.621 (citations omitted).
There is no question

t~at

Midvale City has a right to

adopt an ordinance declaring, defining and providing for the
abatement of nuisances.

But such an ordinance (7-2) must be

in conformity with the general law and the laws relating to
nuisances including the requirements of definiteness and
certainty.
" ... Generally, it is only a public and
not a private nuisance that a municipal
corooration can abate or have abated.
Furthermore, it is only that which is a
nuisance at common law, by declaration of
statute or in fact that can be summarily
abated by a municipal corporation ...
Thus, vested rights in property cannot be
destroyed summarily as a nuisance unless
in a great emergency. Accordingly, a
power given to it to abate nuisances in
any manner it may deem expedient is not
an unrestricted power ... The abatement must
be limited by its necessity
McQuillin, §24.74, p.633.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

It is respectfully submitted that the City having failed
to follow the statutory prescription for the abatement of a
nuisance, which unequivocally contemplates a judicial determination of the allegations made by respondents, the city's
action in revoking appellants' business license because they
maintain a public nuisance is illegal; therefore, the trial
Court should be reversed.

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
ACTION TAKEN BY MIDVALE CITY REVOKING
APPELLANTS' BUSINESS LICENSE, AND THAT
SUCH REVOCATION WAS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS.
There is little question that the revocation of a liquor
license itself ordinarily rests in the studied discretion of
the body which has been delegated such power.

However, there

does exist a question as to the proper exercise of such discretion; for while it is broad, it cannot be applied
arbitrarily or capriciously.
"The intentment of the law is that the
discretionary decision shall be the outcome of examination and consideration, and
not a mere expression of personal will, and
that the refusal of licensing authorities
to issue a license without having made due
inquiry into the relevant facts and without
having stated its reason for such refusal
is arbitrary .... " (45 Am Jur 2d 603,
"Intoxicating Liquors", Sec. 161).
Generally, a business license may be revoked by the issuing authority for legal cause; with that appellants do not
quarrel.

However, what constitutes a legal cause is the heart

All references are hereby made as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)

Transcript of hearing before Judge Sawaya as "Tr."
Transcript of hearing before Midvale City Council as "Tr. :·t.
References to the record before the Utah Supreme Court as "F.
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of the argument in appellants' case.

Again referring to

McQuillin for an elucidation of the principles governing the
revocation of a business license, and particularly a beer or
liquor license the following grounds have been set forth as
those meriting a revocation of such license.
" ... Conviction of a violation of an
intoxicating liquor statute or ordinance
usually affects the revocation or termination of a license thereunder .••• Other
offenses which in particular cases have been
deemed sufficient ground for revocation of a
liquor license or permit have been, .•. the
sale of, or traffic in narcotics, the sale
of whiskey by a beer license, sale of beer
or liquor to minors, female solicitation
of sale of drinks on the licenses premises,
permitting premises to be used as resort
for prostitutes, and the maintenance of a
nuisance offensive to common descency and
morals. McQuillin, §26.197b, p.497,
(citations omitted).
Of all the grounds for revocation stated in the preceding
paragraph only the last ground could possibly form the basis
for a revocatoin in the instant case.

But certainly the

issuance of parking tickets and other police related activities
a block and a half from appellants' place of business (Tr. M.
p.83, lines 16 to 23) do not qualify as the "maintenance of a
nuisance offensive to common descency and morals."
"A revocation for 'cause' generally must be based on a
violation of the liquor law or of regulations promulgated
thereunder."

48 Corpus Juris Secundum 282, "Intoxicating Liquors"

A lack of such determination abuses the Commission's discretion-
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ary power and makes its action arbitrary and capricious.
"Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion
by an administrative board can arise in only three
ways, namely: (a) By neglecting or refusing to use
reasonable diligence and care to procure such
evidence as it is by law authorized to consider
in exercising the discretion vested in it; (b)
By failing to give candid and honest consideration
of the evidence before it on which it is authorized to act in exercising its discretion; (c) By
exercising its discertion in such a manner after
a consideration of evidence before it as clearly
to indicate that its action is based on conclusions from the evidence such that reasonable men
fairly and honestly considering the evidence
must reach contrary conclusions."
(Van De Vegt v.
Board of Com'rs of Larimer County, 55 P2d 705, Colo.
1936).
While the liquor authorities need not follow

t~e

precise

rules of evidence and procedure required to be followed by
judicial officers, they can annul or suspend a license only
on competent proof.

Migliaccio v. O'Connell, 307 NY 566, 122

NE 2d 914.
This inquiry should consist of the taking and examining
of evidence.

The right to revoke or suspend a liquor permit

as a general rule depends on the evidence presented.

The burden

is on the board or officer to prove the facts which constitute
the causes which are alleged as grounds for revocation or suspension.

Cambell v. Galeno Chemical Co., N.Y. 50 S. Ct. 412,

281 US 599, 74 L Ed 1063.

As to the weight and sufficiency

of such evidence, general rules of evidence apply as to
whether it is sufficient to prove particular facts or violations.
Arrow Distilleries v. Alexander, C.C.A., 109 F2d 397.

Although

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt or overwhelming proof is not
required, there must be substantial evidence of probative
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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character to sustain the action of the deciding body.

It has

been held that revocation cannot be based upon evidence which
causes a mere suspicion of a violation of a liquor statute.
Mahanoy Mfg. Co. v. Doran, D.C. Pa. 40 F2d 561.

This Court

went on to say at page 561, "The real question is not so much
over the facts as over the other question of whether the truth
of the charge was brought home to the permitee with that degree
of certainty which would justify a revocation of the permit."
There is no question that where a licensing board conducts
a proper hearing and assigns a valid reason for refusing to
grant a license, the courts, in the absence of a showing that
the action of the board was an abuse of its plain legal duty
in the premises, will not assume there was a lack of substantial
reason for such action.

However, appellants contend that such

was not the case here.
In O'Conner v. City of Moscow, 202 p2d 401, Idaho 1949,
a case involving a question as to whether or not a city ordinance
deeming any change of ownership of an existing business in which
draft beer or liquor by the drink was sold to be a new or additional business and thus prohibited from operating within
specified areas, the Idaho Court, at oage 405, stated:

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"While a license. to operate a beer parlor
••. does not confer any vested property
right, yet if the city makes such
businesses lawful by a permit or license
it cannot arbitrarily, capriciously, or '
unreasonably impair, interfere with or
eradicate the same."
On page 67, 51 Am Jur 2d, "License and Permits",
Sec. 62, it is said:
"The weight to be given to evidence
presented in a hearing in which it is
sought to suspend or revoke a license
rests •.• in the discretion of .•. body
.•. conducting the hearing. However,
it has been said that hearsay evidence,
standing alone, is not sufficient to
support the suspension or revocation of
a license where the licensee is entitled
to a hearing on the matter involved."
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case, the Midvale City Council considered
no hard evidence but relied upon a simple summaries of the
activities of the City Policy Department as it related to the
vicinity of appellants' business premises and which had found
numerous complaints of fighting, other disturbances and
violations.

These allegations have never been supported by

hard evidence and the appellant maintains that they are unfounded and are in effect hearsay allegations.
Revocation of a license for cause has been said to contemplare such cause as would render the licensee unfit to
engage in the licensed activity with his fitness being judged
in the light of the potential evil with which the legislature
was concerned in enacting the licensing legislation.
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This Court in deciding Anderson
county Commissioners,

v.

Utah County Board of

P 2d ___ , 1/4/79, addressed itself

to the exact issue at bar by commenting on the nature of the
governing body's act in its failure to renew a beer license:
and the hearing had thereupon, and also the nature of the beer
license as a valuable property right.

This Court said:

"The spirit of enterprise which impels a person
to initiate and develop a business which provides services to the public and employment
for others is vital to the common welfare.
By the same token that a business must operate
in accordance with lawful regulations and
requirements it should be the policy of the law,
and of officials charged with its administration, to encourage such initiative and enterprise by according it all proper protections
of the law.
In harmony with that purpose there
should be considerable difference in
determining whether an application for
a new license should be granted, as compared
with the renewal of a license where the business has been established and operating for
a number of years.
There are respected authorities which affirm
the proposition that the administrative body
(the County Conunission here) should not have
the same breadth of discretion in refusing the
reestablishment of a new business. The reasonableness and justice of such a rule is apparent
when one reflects on the practicalities of the
situation where the business has been established
and operating for some years and thus represents
a substantial commitment in the time, effort and
expense by the owner.
We do not desire to be understood as saying that
an operating business necessarily has any sue~
vested or inviolable right in the renewal of ~ts
license that t~e licensing authority is without
discretion in determining whether it should be
renewed.
On the other hand, inasmuch as the
licensing of his business does repres~nt.a substantial property interest to the pla~n~~ff,
which also has its effect upon the publ~c we~fare~
it should not be destroyed not disrupted arb~trar~ly,
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nor without following fundamental standards of
due process of law to guard against capricious
or oppressive administrative action.
It is further pertinent to observe that because
beer licenses are available on a quota system
it seems especially reasonable and proper that
a business which has had a license and has been
in operation should have some preference over
any new application; and that the operating
business should have its license renewed unless
there is some reasonable basis for denying it.
The same considerations of fundamental fairness
and justice which prevent an administrative body
from acting in a capricious or arbitrary manner
in other areas of the law also apply in a beer
license, even though it is a business which is
subjected to a high degree of supervision and
regulation in the interest of the public welfare.
(citations omitted).
The foregoing analysis by this Court, reiterates and
reaffirms the long standing principle of law as stated by
McQuillin wherein he states:
" ... the right to carry on a lawful business
is a property right, which can be taken from a
licensee only bv due orocess of law, which
means, it has been held, only after a judicial
hearing and not on a mere resolution of a city
council declaring the license revoked .... a
license once granted may not normally be revoked at the mere option or whim of the licensor.
It is not within the police power of a
city to revoke without cause a license for which
it has accepted a substantial fee, and the application of this rule, it has been said, is not
affected by the character of the business.
McQuillin, §26.8la, pp. 183, 184 (citation omitted,
emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, to revoke appellants' license alone, while in the
same building, within thirty (30) feet on either direction of
the front door of appellants' place of business, there are
also two additional establishments selling beer and utilizing
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the same parking lot, and not revoke the license of the
other two establishments is an arbitrary discriminatory act
on the part of Midvale City.

McQuillin adds that:

":·· ~ ~unicipal~ty has no authority to
and without
cause between licensees by revoking one
license and not those of others who
occupy exactly the same Position. The
cause for revocation of
whole class
of licenses or permits must affect the
hole class or the revocation will not be
sustained.
In other words, the holder
of a license is entitled to equal protection of the laws. McQuillin, S26.8l(a),
p.l84 (citations omitted).
d~scr~m~nate arb~trarily

a

Based upon the indicated lack of facts and evidence,
which at best they can be termed double hearsay, the Midvale
City Council's action and method of revoking appellants'
business license was both arbitrary and capricious, denied
appellants' substantive due process of law and the enforcement of the licensing ordinance and the revocation of the licensewas discriminatory.

Nowhere in the record there appears facts

to justify the city's action in revoking the license; what
the record shows are facts relating to parking problems,
fighting, etc., and the cause of which could be the patrons
of two other establishments located within the same building
as that of appellants' premises, and an attempt by city officials
to close down a successful business, without the necessity of a
judicial determination of the underlying facts and circumstances.
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POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING
ITS ORDER DATED JUNE 25, 1979, WITHOUT
ENTERING CONCURRENTLY THEREWITH FINDINGS
OF FACT TO SUPPORT SAID ORDER.
At the conclusion of the hearing held June 12, 1979,
in the District Court, the trial Court took the matter under
advisement, and thereafter it merely entered its Order, as
it appears on pages 128 and 129 of this record, affirming
the action of the City Council.

Such action by the District

Court without the formal entry of adequate Findings of Fact
to support the trial Court's order is reversible error and
the judgment of the trial Court should be vacated.
v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners,

Anderson
P2d

January 4, 1979.
Subsequently to appellants' filing of their Notice of
Appeal, respondents sought to amend the Findings and Order
of the District Court.

The district court allowed respondents

to " ..• amend the Order entered on the 25th day of June, 1979,
... "over the objections of appellants, and, thereafter
respondents filed for the Court's approval Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, and an Amended Order of Judgment,
dated July 3, 1979.
It is appellants' contention that the trial Court erred
in granting respondents' motion to amend on the basis and

for the reason that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
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to hear respondents·• motion because jurisdiction of this case
after the Notice of Appeal was filed, rested exclusively with
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
Respondents' Motion to Amend, after the Notice of Appeal
was filed by appellants, could not continue the jurisdiction
of the trial Court and could not suspend the finality of
judgment appealed from, and to do so amounted to reversible
error.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial
Court should be reversed and the following relief granted:
1.

The revocation of appellants' business license

by respondents on the theory of abating a nuisance should be
declared null and void.
2.

In the alternative, this Court should find that the

revocation of appellants' business license was arbitrary and
capricious and that City of Midvale should be ordered to reinstate the same upon payment of the necessary fees by
appellants.
3.

In the alternative, if this Court upholds the

District Court in its review of the proceedings held by
respondents, a restraining order should issue directing
Midvale City to refrain with appellants'

operatio~

of their

business until the Complaint on file with the District Court
has been herad on its merits.

DATED this

day of November, 1979.
Respectfully Submitted

N?&.~
Attorney for Appellants
610 East South Temple
Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone No. (801) 521-4441
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